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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 19, 1983, in Miami's federal courthouse, opening
statements began in the criminal trial of Federal Judge Alcee L. Has-
tings, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida.
Judge Hastings had been indicted for bribery. Prior to the commence-
ment of this criminal trial, Judge Hastings instituted a constitutional
challenge to the criminal justice system. Judge Hastings is the first fed-
eral judge in United States history to claim that an active federal judge
is immune from criminal prosecution prior to impeachment by
Congress.
The major issue throughout this monumental case is best stated by
the Roman philosopher, Juvenal: "Quis quatodiet ipsos custodes, or,
who is to judge the judges[?]" 1 This article will focus on the decision
issued by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.2 The position taken in
this paper is not designed to address the merits of the criminal trial.
Nor is this article to be construed as to imply the guilt or innocence of
Judge Hastings but rather to examine the narrow procedural issues dis-
cussed in the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. Thompson & Pollitt, Impeachment of Federal Judges-An Historical Over-
view, 49 N.C.L. REV. 87, 87 (1970).
2. The first issue in United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982),
whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal, will not be
discussed in this article. The Eleventh Circuit held that they had jurisdiction because
the issue was collateral in that it could not be effectively reviewed from a final judg-
ment. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651 (1977); United States v. Brizendine, 659 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States
v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1976); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1976).
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II. INDICTMENT
On December 29, 1981, a federal grand jury, in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida, returned a four count indictment against Federal Judge
Alcee L. Hastings and William A. Borders, Jr. Mr. Borders, allegedly
became involved with Judge Hastings when an undercover agent, pos-
ing as a defendant in one of Hastings' cases (United States v. Ro-
mano)3 approached Borders to set up a bribe. Other than this connec-
tion, Mr. Borders had not been involved in any way with this case.
Hastings, a federal judge since November 30, 1979, was charged with
offenses in two counts of the indictment.'
The first count charged Judge Hastings with "conspiracy to solicit
and accept money in return for unlawful influence in performance of
lawful governmental functions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371."' The
indictment charged that Judge Hastings and Mr. Borders solicited and
accepted a bribe from an undercover agent posing as a defendant in
Romano. Specifically, Hastings was alleged to have agreed to reduce
the defendant's prison sentence and to revoke an order which required
the defendant to forfeit certain property in return for $150,000.6
3. 523 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
4. Counts III and IV of the indictment charged only Borders with traveling in
interstate commerce in furtherance of bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
After a change of venue to the Northern District of Georgia, Borders was convicted by
a jury on all four counts on May 7, 1982. He has appealed the conviction.
5. United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 707 n.2 (1982). 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1976) provides in full:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in
any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the
conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy
shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such
misdemeanor.
However, in the Brief for Appellant the Hon. Alcee L. Hastings at 3, United States v.
Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hastings Brief] the
charge stated that he "had been influenced in making a judicial decision by the prom-
ise of a bribe. (R. 1-5)." (emphasis added).
6. Hastings, 681 F.2d at 707.
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The second count charged Hastings "with corruptly impeding due
administration of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 12 and § 1503.''7
The indictment alleged that Hastings obstructed the due administration
of justice by disclosing to Borders the substance of the unissued order
in Romano. The acts alleged would have involved the exercise of Has-
tings' judicial authority.
Hastings' first argument was made in the motion to quash the in-
dictments. He claimed that a federal district court does not have juris-
diction over the criminal prosecution of an active federal judge prior to
removal from office. This motion was denied by the district court. How-
ever, on appeal, a stay was granted by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals" until they reviewed and affirmed the district court's decision
7. Hastings, 681 F.2d at 707 n.2.
18 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) provides in full:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is pun-
ishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976) provides in full:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter
or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any wit-
ness, in any court of the United States or before any United States magis-
trate or other committing magistrate, or any grand or petit juror, or officer
in or of any court of the United States or officer who may be serving at
any examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate
or other committing magistrate, in discharge of his duty, or injures any
party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or
having attended such court or examination before such officer, magistrate,
or other committing magistrate, or on account of his testifying or having
testified to any matter pending therein .... or injures any such officer,
magistrate, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on
account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats
or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, ob-
structs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede, the due
administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
(emphasis added).
8. Historically, when a criminal action was brought against a federal judge, prior
to impeachment, the House of Representatives stayed its hand until the criminal pro-
625 117:1983
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rejecting Hastings' argument. As a result of the Eleventh Circuit's de-
cision, the criminal trial commenced on January 19, 1983, prior to the
initiation of any impeachment proceeding.
III. HASTINGS' THREE ARGUMENTS
A. Textual Reading of Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of United States
Constitution
Hastings raised three major issues on appeal. The first argument
was that a literal reading of Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the
United States ConstitutionO mandated a sequence of impeachment
prior to criminal prosecution. This granted Congress the exclusive
power to remove a federal judge. Through the use of the maxim, Ex-
pressio unius exclusio est aterus, a federal judge has an absolute right
not to be tried in federal court unless and until he is impeached and
convicted (removed) by Congress. 10 The explicit language in the Con-
stitution precludes the existence of concurrent power to prosecute un-
lawful acts of a federal judge. Hastings argued that through the indict-
ment the executive branch has "chose[n] to bypass the judicial
mechanisms Congress created."""
B. Separation of Powers Doctrine
Hastings' primary argument was that the separation of powers
doctrine is designed to prevent one branch of government from en-
croaching on the powers of the other branches of government. Congress
ceedings were adjudicated. See Brief for Appellee United States of America at 40,
United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (1 1th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as United
States Brief]. Never has a judge, after conviction of an impeachable crime, remained in
office. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 states:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to re-
moval from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punisment, according to Law.
10. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 17.
11. Hastings Brief, supra note 5, at 48.
626 Nova Law Journal
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is explicitly given the power to cut across the lines fixed by the separa-
tion of powers doctrine through the impeachment provision in the Con-
stitution. The separation of powers doctrine stands in the way of any
legislative removal of executive and judicial officers except as such re-
moval is expressly authorized in the impeachment provision.
C. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980
Hastings' final argument was that the creation of The Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 198012
(hereinafter referred to as the Judicial Conduct Act of 1980) reaf-
firmed his argument that impeachment was the exclusive form of re-
moval for a federal judge.13 Through this act "Congress expressly re-
tained and asserted the exclusivity of its removal power."1
IV. GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
A. Interpretation of Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of United States
Constitution
The government maintained that in Article I, Section 3, Clause 7
the framers of the Constitution explicitly provided for the procedural
rights of an accused during the impeachment process.15 This clause was
not intended to prevent criminal prosecutions of federal judges' unlaw-
12. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (Supp. IV 1980).
13. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 21, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., I Stat. 117 (1845).
Hastings also examined the Act of 1790 created by the First Congress. The pertinent
part of the statute stated that a federal judge convicted of bribery "shall forever be
disqualified to hold any office of honour, trust or profit under the United States." Id.
Hastings argued that this statute did not specify if criminal prosecution was to precede
removal. The government countered that the Act of 1790 would be superfluous unless
criminal prosecution took place prior to impeachment because a judge convicted in an
impeachment proceding would already be removed from office and thereby disqualified
from holding the position. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 27. This statute indi-
cates that Congress anticipated trials for bribery prior to the initiation of impeachment
proceedings.
14. Hastings Brief, supra note 5, at 25.
15. Hastings, 681 F.2d at 710.
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ful acts.16 Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 clarifies the rights of civil of-
ficers, which includes judges, and was not intended to limit the jurisdic-
tion of Article III courts.17 It does not establish a mandatory sequence
between these two independent processes.18 Instead the purpose behind
Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 was twofold: 1) to distinguish impeach-
ment from English Common Law where criminal sanctions (severe
penalties such as death) could be imposed on an impeached judge and
2) to anticipate the question concerning double jeopardy and to avoid
this claim if the criminal trial is subsequent to the impeachment
proceedings. 19
B. Separation of Powers Doctrine
Although impeachment is the only explicit method of removal pro-
vided in the Constitution, the government contended that it was not.
necessarily intended to be the exclusive remedy for reprimanding a fed-
eral judge. Nothing in the text of the Constitution either explicitly or
implicitly exempts judges from federal prosecution.2 0 If the drafters in-
tended judicial immunity for judges from criminal prosecution, they
would have explicitly provided for it in the Constitution.
The government took the non-exclusivist position created by Shar-
tel21 and later expanded by Raoul Berger.22 According to this position,
impeachment is not the exclusive means of reprimanding a federal
judge.
The government in analyzing the separation of powers doctrine ar-
gument examined the several Constitutional Conventions. None of the
remarks made in these Constitutional Conventions suggested that
judges were to be immune from traditional judicial controls.23 Rather
16. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 16-17.
17. Hastings. 681 F.2d at 710.
18. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 23.
19. Id. at 21-23.
20. Id. at 17.
21. Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some
Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870 (1930).
22. Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J.
1475 (1970).
23. Id. at 1503.
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Congress' jurisdiction is to be concurrent and not exclusive.24
A criminal conviction prior to impeachment does not violate the
separation of powers doctrine because "whatever immunities or privi-
leges the Constitution confers for the purpose of assuring the indepen-
dence of co-equal branches of government they do not exempt the
members of those branches 'from the operation of the ordinary criminal
law.' "25 Criminal conduct is not to be protected by the separation of
powers doctrine because criminal acts are not within the necessary
functions to be performed by public officials. The executive branch
would not be intruding upon the judicial branch if the act was outside
the scope of the judge's office.26 In United States v. Nixon,2 7 the Su-
preme Court held that the separate powers allocated to each branch of
government was not intended to operate with absolute independence.
C. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980
An analysis of the Judicial Conduct Act of 19801 reveals that it
does not deal with criminal prosecution of federal judges. The Judicial
Conduct Act of 1980 "establishes a mechanism within the judiciary for
processing and remedying complaints against federal judges arising
from their mental or physical disability or conduct prejudicial to the
effective administration of justice."2'
The Judicial Conduct Act of 1980 is based "on the premise that
24. Shartel, supra note 21, at 894.
25. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1144 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974).
26. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 23-24.
27. 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (Supp. IV 1980). Complaints of senility or physical disabil-
ity of a federal judge do not give rise to an impeachable or indictable offense. This was
the gap that Congress remedied through the enactment of the Judicial Conduct Act of
1980. Under the Judicial Conduct Act of 1980, federal judges who are senile or ill have
their cases assigned to another federal judge.
When a judge is impeached and found guilty, he is denied his salary, tenure, pen-
sion and removed from office, whereas, when a judge's cases are assigned to another
judge he retains his office and his salary.
29. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 36-37.
629 117:1983
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the judiciary is subject to controls other than impeachment. '3 0 During
the hearings on the Act, the Honorable Elmo B. Hunter, a United
States District Court judge for the Western District of Missouri, com-
mented that "[w]e need not discuss criminal conduct as such. Federal
and state criminal statutes apply to every federal judge just as they
apply to any other citizen.131
Even though both briefs set forth extensive arguments concerning
this Act, the Eleventh Circuit in Hastings stated in a footnote that
Hastings' argument was totally devoid of merit. 2
V. THE BASIS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION
A. History of Impeachment
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court examined the
history of impeachment as it related to prior cases involving federal
judges.3 3 Through the impeachment provisions of the Constitution,
Congress was given the explicit power to ensure that the federal judges
30. Id. at 37 n.23.
31. Id. at 38. In addition, a similar remark was made by Representative Kas-
tenmeier; "Nothing in the legislation precludes a complainant from bringing any mat-
ter to the attention of the House of Representatives for an impeachment inquiry or to
the U.S. Department of Justice for a criminal investigation." United States Brief,
supra note 8, at 39 n.24 (quoting 126 CONG. REc. H8785 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980)).
32. Hastings, 681 F.2d at 712 n.20.
33. 1929-Francis Winslow-Judge in Southern District of New York. Judge
Francis Winslow resigned before his criminal trial commenced and on the day im-
peachment proceedings were to begin in the House of Representatives.
1940-Martin Manton-Second Circuit Judge. Resigned during his criminal trial.
Ultimately tried and convicted. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939).
1941-John Warren Davis-Judge in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. He was
indicted and while remaining in office was, a defendant in two criminal trials. The jury
could not reach a verdict in either case and the indictments were dismissed. Before
impeachment proceedings began, he resigned from office.
For a discussion of the proceedings concerning these three federal judges see J.
BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE (1962); Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 1, at 108;
Ferrick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study Of The Constitutional Provisions, 39
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 25 (1970).
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act within their judicial capacity.34 According to the United States
Constitution, Congress has the "sole power to impeach"35 "civil of-
ficers," 36 including federal judges, for "Treason, Bribery or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors. ' 37 If impeached and convicted by the
United States Senate, the judge is removed from office and precluded
from holding any office in the United States government. 8
B. United States v. Isaacs
Until United States v. Isaacs,39 in 1974, no one questioned the
power of the executive or judicial branch to prosecute federal judges
prior to impeachment.40 The issue was raised in this case because one
of the defendants, Otto Kerner, was a sitting Seventh Circuit federal
judge. The Eleventh Circuit relied solely on this case because it was the
only decision in the area.
34. Since 1796, the qualifications of at least forty-seven federal judges have been
questioned in the House of Representatives. Only nine federal judges have been actu-
ally impeached by the House of Representatives. Out of these nine judges, four were
acquitted by the Senate, four were convicted and one resigned.
For an extensive history on the impeachment of these nine federal judges, see
Ford, Impeachment-A Mace for the Federal Judiciary. 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 669
(1971); Kelley & Wyllie, The Congressional Impeachment Power as it Relates to the
Federal Judiciary, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 678 (1971); Thompson & Pollitt, supra note
1.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 states:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And
no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present.
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 states:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
37. Id.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
39. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
40. In Isaacs, Judge Kerner of the Seventh Circuit raised the same argument as
Judge Hastings on appeal, but it was denied. Judge Kerner was convicted and resigned
prior to being sent to prison.
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In Isaacs, there were nineteen counts to the indictment,4 the ma-
jority of which related to activities that allegedly took place while
Judge Kerner was governor of Illinois and prior to his appointment to
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Even though a majority
of the charges against Judge Kerner in Isaacs did not involve acts
within his judicial capacity, the Seventh Circuit, in dicta, stated "[t]he
Constitution does not forbid the trial of a federal judge for criminal
offenses committed either before or after the assumption of judicial of-
fice." 42 Thus, if a federal judge can be criminally prosecuted for acts
prior to his taking office, a fortiori, he can also be subject to criminal
liability for acts committed within his judicial office. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Hastings, extended the holding in Isaacs and used Isaacs' dicta
to reach the holding in Hastings.
C. Immunities
1. Congressmen
The Eleventh Circuit analogized the prosecution of congressmen to
the prosecution of federal judges in reaching their decision. Congress-
men can be criminally prosecuted prior to expulsion by the House of
Representatives.4 3 There is no indication in the Constitution that judges
are to be held to a different standard. A parallel can be drawn between
federal judges and congressmen concerning criminal acts of a federal
official committed within his official capacity. If the framers of the
41. The major charges were mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976); conspiracy, 18
U.S.C. § 1952 (1976); and perjury before a grand jury, 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976). All
of these charges related to the conspiracy count which involved an Illinois racing opera-
tion. The perjury charge was the only activity which took place after Kerner took office
as a federal district judge. It is important to note that the perjury charge was in no way
connected with Judge Kerner's performance of his judicial duties. Judge Kerner was
eventually sentenced to three years in prison and fined $50,000.
42. Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1142 (emphasis added).
43. A Congressman can argue that he can not be indicted or tried until he is
expelled by Congress, because the Constitution explicitly provides for a method of re-
moving him from office. United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 710 n.10 (11 th Cir.
1982). U.S. CONsT. art. I § 5, cl. 2.
This argument, which is similar to Hastings' argument, has been rejected. See
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344
(1906); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978).
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would have explicitly provided for it. This argument gains support
when viewed in light of the expressed provisions of the speech and de-
bate clause for congressmen and the limited immunity from arrest
clause for congressmen.4
2. Judges-Civil Immunity
At common law, judges enjoyed absolute immunity from civil lia-
bility for acts committed within their judicial capacity. 5 However, the
immunity does not apply if the act is outside the scope of his judicial
capacity.
Judicial immunity is thus neither an absolute nor an unlimited bar
to any suit brought against a judge or judicial officer. Common-law
immunities extend only so far as the interests of the common good
demand protection for the holder of the office from liability from
carrying out his official functions. The application of the doctrine
44. U.S. CoNsr. art. I § 6, cl. 1 states in part:
They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace,
be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their
respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place.
45. The Civil Immunity doctrine for judges was established in Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
Even when a judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly for the benefit of
the public, he is civilly immune. Judges should be at liberty to exercise their own func-
tion with independence and without fear of consequences. See Burton v. United States,
202 U.S. 344 (1906).
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), created the well-established doctrine that
judges are immune from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), involved a situation where a judge,
without a hearing or notice to a young retarded girl, ordered the girl sterilized. The
Supreme Court held that the judge was not civilly liable because he was acting within
his judicial capacity.
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), in this case blacks were deprived of due
process by a state circuit court judge. In dicta the Supreme Court held that no official
is granted immunity from criminal prosecution.
See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
7:1983
6331U.S. v. Hastings
11
Santoro: Federal Judges' Absolute Immunity from CriminalProsecution Prior
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
634 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
of judicial immunity is restricted to its single objective of protect-
ing judicial freedom in the process of deciding civil and criminal
cases. Where the initiative and independence of the judiciary is not
effectively impaired the doctrine of judicial immunity does not
hold.4
Thus, the judge's cloak of civil immunity does not grant him im-
munity from criminal prosecution. The criminal statutes, in their appli-
cation, allow no exceptions. 47 Blanket immunity has never been ex-
tended to any class of citizens or governmental officials with the
exception of foreign diplomats.48
The absolute immunity from civil liability was not intended to pro-
tect the judicial office.4'9 The immunity from civil liability is premised
on the balancing of "the public benefit derived from the judicial inde-
pendence created by the immunity [weighed against] the sacrifice suf-
fered by aggrieved individuals who are deprived of their civil reme-
dies." 50 If federal judges were granted immunity from criminal acts, it
would be a great threat to the public interest.5 1 A federal judge should
be able to function in his judicial office without fear of retribution for
his beliefs or unpopular decisions.5 2 A judge can not be criminally pros-
ecuted for the manner in which he exercises his judicial power.
When a criminal act is involved, there is no balancing of interests.
Bribery defeats the purpose of the judicial system. The purpose of the
judicial system is to give a person a fair and impartial trial. Criminal
laws are a method of vindicating a public interest5 3 and are dissimilar
from civil interests which are private in nature. The judicial system has
"never suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil im-
munity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the
46. Shore v. Howard, 414 F. Supp. 379, 385 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
47.• United States Brief, supra note 8, at 16.
48. Id. at 17.
49. Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes
from History, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1969). See also Kelley & Wyllie, supra note
34.
50. Hastings, 681 F.2d at 711 n.17.
51. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 34 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976)).
52. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978).
53. Kelley & Wyllie, supra note 34, at 891.
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reach of the criminal law." 5'
VI. IMPEACHMENT VERSUS CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
The impeachment process is a separate and distinct mechanism
from the criminal law system. 5 Historically, the impeachment process
was depicted as cumbersome and fraught with political overtones. 56 Im-
peachment was not intended to be a substitute for a criminal trial. The
criminal trial is broader in scope. The impeachment process is a supple-
ment to the criminal prosecution. 57 Impeachment "is a proceeding of
[an] entirely political nature and relates solely to the accused's rights
to hold civil office, not to the many other rights which are his as a
citizen and which protect him in a court of law."58 The impeachment
proceeding does not determine guilt as in a criminal trial but rather
determines if there has been an abuse of power which in turn makes
the judge unfit to hold office.
In addition, the impeachment process lacks many of the procedu-
ral safeguards mandatory in a criminal trial. The safeguards in a crimi-
nal trial consist of an impartial jury, evidentiary rules, the state carry-
ing the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant's
ability to appeal. A charge on the House floor leaves a judge defense-
less, whereas in a criminal trial he would be innocent until proven
guilty. "[T]he judicial process provides a more appropriate forum for
the resolution of guilt or innocence than does the more political im-
peachment process."5 9 The Seventh Circuit in Isaacs reaffirmed this
statement by stating:
[T]he independence of the judiciary is better served when criminal
54. See supra note 50 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428-29).
55. Ford, supra note 34 at 670 (1971).
56. Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1144. See Shartel, supra note 21 at 872 (1930). See also
Brief for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union-Florida at 2, United States
v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11 th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Brief],
which states "The framers deliberately designed a cumbersome impeachment process
to ensure that the judiciary would enjoy independence from the other branches of
government.
57. Berger, supra note 22, at 1490 (1970).
58. Ford, supra note 34, at 670.
59. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 6.
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charges against its members are tried in a court rather than in
Congress. With a court trial, a judge is assured of the protections
given to all those charged with criminal conduct. The issues [in a
criminal prosecution] . . . are subject to the rules of evidence, the
presumption of innocence and other safeguards .6
There are different sanctions imposed by each process. Impeach-
ment does not impose a penalty, as in a criminal case, on the judge.
The purpose of the impeachment provisions in the Constitution is not
intended to punish the individual as in a criminal trial, but rather to
protect the public and the political office. Thus, there is a distinction
between an indictable offense and an impeachable offense. 1
An impeachable offense involves conduct of a judge which is inju-
rious to society due to an abuse of his public office. In this context, a
bribery or a conspiracy charge is an act which can be considered both
an indictable and an impeachable offense. The former process is a
criminal mechanism and the latter is a political mechanism. Due to the
inherent political overtones and lack of procedural safeguards, the im-
peachment process can result in non-removal despite clear guilt, or visa
versa.
6 2
VII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE Hastings DECISION
The Eleventh Circuit did not examine the ramifications of its deci-
sion and chose not to address whether or under what circumstances an
extended prison sentence might approach in substance a removal from
office.6 3 As previously noted, most judges who have been criminally
convicted have resigned prior to the initiation of the impeachment pro-
ceedings. 4 Yet, the problem remains when a judge is criminally con-
victed and does not resign from office prior to impeachment. With the
slow process of impeachment a convicted criminal could technically re-
main in office until impeached by Congress. Hastings argued that if a
federal judge is first criminally convicted, then impeachment will be a
60. Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1144.
61. Kelley & Wyllie, supra note 34, at 682.
62. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 44.
63. United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 712 n.19 (11th Cir. 1982).
64. See supra note 33.
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mere formality and have no independent significance.6 5
The American Civil Liberties Union, in its Amicus Curiae brief,
argued that even an acquittal of Judge Hastings in the criminal trial
would in effect act as a partial removal from office. 66 This is because
Hastings would be compelled to excuse himself whenever the United
States is a party. 7 This would greatly interfere with his judicial duties.
"Any interest of the United States not addressed in the impeachment
process could be resolved at a later trial, if the judge was removed
[first] by the Congress."68
The Amicus Curiae brief expressed the fear that a criminal prose-
cution would induce selective prosecution by the executive branch.6 9
The executive branch may use a criminal prosecution as a mechanism
to oust judges who are unfavorable to the United States government.
The American Civil Liberties Union characterized Hastings as a liberal
judge, a lenient sentencer, and a judge who has ruled against the gov-
ernment on several occasions prior to his indictment. 70 The District
Court in Hastings held that the record was absent any evidence to sup-
port the allegation that the government's motivation in bringing the
criminal charges against Hastings was vindictive or retaliatory in
nature.71
The federal courts adhered to the universal precept:
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No
65. Hastings Brief, supra note 5, at 43 states: "Although. . conviction of and
imprisonment for criminal abuse of official power does not remove a judge from office,
the clear practical effect of a conviction would be removal."
Relating the Supreme Court opinion in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), to the
Hastings case, if Judge Hastings was acquitted, any person tried and convicted before
Judge Hastings would have strong grounds upon which to claim that he was denied the
due process required by the Constitution. Therefore, taking Hastings' argument one
step further, even if a judge is acquitted of all charges he still may not be able to carry
out his duties as a judge. Hastings Brief, supra note 5, at 44 n.23.
66. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 56, at 11.
67. Id. at 11-12.
68. Hastings Brief, supra note 5, at 54.
69. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 56, at 2-3.
70. National Council of Churches v. Egan, No. 79-2959 (S.D. Fla. 1979), is an
example of a Hastings decision which was against the government. In this case, the
government was required to continue to issue work permits for Haitian refugees.
71. Hastings, 681 F.2d at 711 n.16.
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officer of the law may set that law at a defiance with impunity. All
the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are
creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it. It is the only su-
preme power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority
which it gives.72
V. CONCLUSION
"[O]ur rights are only as secure as our judiciary. ' I If immunity
from criminal prosecution was granted to federal judges, it would
"frustrate the overriding need to detect and eliminate corruption in the
judiciary."74 This immunity would erode the public's confidence in the
judiciary system and in the long run it would weaken the judicial
branch. The executive branch has the power, independent of and con-
current with Congress' impeachment power, to criminally prosecute a
federal judge. The rights and immunities granted to the federal judges
are conferred on the office for the benefit of the people and not for the
judge's personal benefit. The judge holds a position of trust and a
fiduciary duty to the public. All are expected to conform to the law
enacted by Congress. Criminal statutes allow no exceptions.
In Hastings, the Eleventh Circuit, following Isaacs, held that an
active judge, prior to impeachment, could be subject to federal criminal
prosecution for acts within the exerxcise of his judicial authority. The
judicial title does not shield its holder from criminal prosecution un-
less the act falls within the prescribed common law immunity for
judges. Thus, the nature of the judicial office does not raise a judge
above the law, but rather holds him to the same legal responsibilities as
any other citizen. 8
72. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
73. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 56, at 14.
74. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 6.
75. Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 1945). Mr. Braate-
lien (defendant) was a Conciliation Commissioner who was administering the Frazier-
Lemke Act. He was found guilty of conspiracy to defraud the United States by cor-
ruptly administering the Frazier-Lemke Act.
76. Prior to the publication of this article, on February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings
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Prior to the publication of this article Judge Hastings was acquit-
ted of all charges in the criminal trial. This vindication supports the
position taken in this paper. The system functioned properly and en-
ables the public to continue their trust in both Judge Hastings and in
the judicial system.
In addition, at the publication of this article, Judge Hastings was
under investigation by a special five judge committee due to a miscon-
duct complaint filed under a 1980 law. 1 This panel will report to the
councils of judges governing the Eleventh Circuit. The 1980 law pro-
hibits disclosure of the investigation and as a result the nature of the
investigation is not clear.
Victoria Santoro
was found not guilty of all criminal charges.
77. The Miami Herald, Apr. 21, 1983, § D, at 1.
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